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I. Introduction 
 
Reparation to victims is an important innovation of the Rome Statute. Article 75 of the 
Statute enables the International Criminal Court (ICC) to award reparations to victims who 
suffered harm as a result of the acts of a convicted perpetrator. Reparations can be individual 
or collective or both, and may take the form of inter alia, restitution, compensation and/or 
rehabilitation.1 At the time of writing, the ICC has awarded reparations in respect of victims 
following the conviction of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. The Trial Chamber issued a decision on 
the principles and the process to be implemented for reparations to victims in that case in 
2012,2 and in March 2015, the Appeals Chamber issued its judgment on the appeals of that 
decision.3 A second reparations process was also underway in the Germain Katanga case, 
following his conviction on 7 March 20144 and sentence on 23 May 2014.5 On 15 December 
2014, the Registry filed a report on the applications for reparations that had been received in 
                                                          
1 Article 75(1) of the Rome Statute. 
2 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, ICC-01/04-01/06, 7 
August 2012. 
3 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Judgment on the appeals against the “Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be 
applied to reparations” of 7 August 2012 with AMENDED order for reparations (Annex A) and public annexes 1 and 2, ICC-01/04-01/06-
3129, 3 March 2015 
4 ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Jugement rendu en application de l’article 74 du Statut, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436, 7 March 2014. 
5 ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Décision relative à la peine (article 76 du Statut), ICC-01/04-01/07-3484, 23 May 2014. 
the Katanga case.6 Subsequently, the Trial Chamber set a deadline for interested States or 
other interested persons to apply for leave to file submissions relating to reparations,7 which 
was thereafter extended.8   
 
The ICC Appeals Chamber has made clear that ‘a convicted person’s liability for reparations 
must be proportionate to the harm caused and, inter alia, his or her participation in the 
commission of the crimes for which he or she was found guilty, in the specific circumstances 
of the case’.9 The Appeals Chamber also determined that indigence is not an obstacle to the 
imposition of liability for reparations on the convicted person, because the assets of the 
convicted perpetrator may in principle be located and seized at some future date.10  These are 
important statements of principle, and make clear that to the extent possible, the ICC 
understands its role as far more than symbolic; the obligation of a convicted perpetrator to 
afford reparations to victims is understood in much the same way as States’ obligations to 
afford reparations for internationally wrongful acts including violations of human rights. The 
jurisprudence and relevant international principles concerning State responsibility affirm that 
the quantum and/or quality of reparations must reflect the harm caused and adequately 
redress the suffering of victims.11   
 
The ICC Appeals Chamber’s holding that reparations need to be proportionate to the harm is 
perhaps both a blessing and a curse. It makes clear that the ICC understands its role in 
reparations as larger, or more significant, than merely providing symbolic gestures or charity 
to eligible victims.12 But at the same time, it underscores the importance of the ICC’s 
cooperation regime for the tracing, freezing, seizing and eventual transfer of assets for the 
benefit of reparations. If that cooperation regime works, then the ICC’s proportionate 
reparations awards have a chance of being enforced, at least in those instances when there are 
assets to be had and the perpetrates are not impecunious. If the cooperation regime fails, then 
                                                          
6 ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Registry Report on Applications for Reparations in accordance with Trial Chamber II’s Order of 27 
August 2014, ICC-01/04-01/07-3512, 15 December 2014. 
7 ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Scheduling order for interested States or other interested persons to apply for leave to file 
submissions pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/07-3516, 21 January 2015. 
8 ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Order extending the deadline for interested States and other interested persons to apply for leave to 
file submissions pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/07-3518, 2 February 2015. 
9 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, Appeals Chamber judgment, 3 March 2015, para. 118. 
10 Ibid, paras. 102-105. 
11 See, e.g., Permanent Court of International Justice, Fourteenth (Ordinary) Session, The Factory at Chorzow (Claim for Indemnity) (The 
Merits), Germany v Poland, Judgment No.13, 13 September 1928, File E.c.XIII., Docket XIV: I., para. 73; UN Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (‘UN Basic Principles and Guidelines’), Adopted by General Assembly resolution 60/147, 16 
December 2005.     
12 See, in contrast, the approach taken by the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case, which took a much more restricted approach to 
reparations. ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, 7 
August 2012. 
the ambitions of the ICC in regards to reparations risk being incapable of realising their full 
potential.13 Reparations awards might end up being another form of ‘lip-service’ to victims. 
The Assembly of States Parties noted in its resolution on cooperation adopted in December 
2014, that as ‘the identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of any assets of the convicted 
person are indispensable for reparations, it is of paramount importance that all necessary 
measures are taken to that end.’14 This is further underscored in its resolution on cooperation 
adopted at the same time.15 
 
This paper outlines what the cooperation regime for the recovery of property and assets looks 
like, how it is supposed to work, and how it works in practice.  With respect to the Court’s 
practice, some of the filings and orders issued by the Court remain confidential. As such, it 
can be difficult to piece together a clear picture of what has happened and why. However, 
increasingly, there is a practise of de-classifying documents once the need for their 
confidentiality ceases. Thus, albeit with some delay, the Court’s approach to assets and 
related orders is slowly becoming more apparent.   
 
To date, it is probably fair to say that the regime has under-performed, for a combination of 
reasons. Sometimes, property or assets of accused persons has simply not been located 
because the persons are impecunious; there are no assets to be found. This has been the case 
with respect to Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the first person to be convicted by the Court, and as 
argued by the Registry, is likely to be the norm:16 ‘The situation where the accused had no 
assets for reparations [is] considered the normal situation; the situation where he had 
sufficient funds available, the exception.’17 However, in many other instances, assets have not 
been successfully located for arguably other reasons that the Court can progressively work to 
address and/or States have not adequately or sufficiently cooperated with requests for the 
location and freezing of assets, as they are required to do. The reasons for these latter failings 
stem from:  
 
                                                          
13 Certainly, the ICC’s Trust Fund for Victims in the exercise of its full discretion may apply its voluntary resources to aid in the 
implementation of a reparations award, particularly where a convicted perpetrator is indigent. However, as has been determined by the 
Appeals Chamber in the Lubanga case, the trust fund is not obliged to use its funds in this way. See, ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, 
Appeals Chamber judgment, 3 March 2015, paras. 111-114.    
14 Assembly of States Parties, Resolution on “Victims and affected communities, reparations and Trust Fund for Victims”, ICC-
ASP/13/Res.4, Adopted at the 12th plenary meeting, on 17 December 2014, by consensus, para. 10. 
15 Assembly of States Parties, Resolution on cooperation, ICC-ASP/13/Res.3, Adopted at the 12th plenary meeting, on 17 December 2014, 
by consensus, para. 22.  
16 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Second Report of the Registry on Reparations, ICC‐01/04‐01/06‐2806, 1 September 2011, paras. 
10, 21.  
17 Ibid, para 128. 
i) The weak statutory framework with vaguely articulated State obligations 
particularly in respect of pre-conviction precautionary measures.  
 
ii) Inadequate cooperation by States. Many States Parties have failed to set up the 
necessary domestic structures, appoint focal points to deal with eventual requests 
and remove legal or procedural barriers to cooperation including restrictive 
banking secrecy laws which might operate at the domestic or inter-State level. The 
failure to adequately and proactively address these areas has meant that the ground 
is not prepared for States to comply with cooperation requests that concern assets 
if and when those requests are made. Also, States’ responses to actual requests 
that have made to date have invariably though with some notable exceptions, been 
weak, too slow or ineffectual. The Assembly of States Parties has underscored the 
importance of, and called on all States Parties to put in place and further improve, 
‘effective procedures and mechanisms that enable States Parties and other States 
to cooperate with the Court in relation to the identification, tracing and freezing or 
seizure of proceeds, property and assets as expeditiously as possible.’18 In the 
Lubanga case, the Pre-Trial Chamber highlighted that ‘existing technology makes 
it possible for a person to place most of his assets and moveable property beyond 
the Court's reach in only a few days. Therefore, if assets and property are not 
seized or frozen at the time of the execution of a cooperation request for arrest and 
surrender, or very soon thereafter, it is likely that the subsequent efforts of the Pre-
Trial Chamber, the Prosecution or the victims participating in the case will be 
fruitless.’19 
 
iii) Inadequate attention and resources deployed to advance the issue and promote 
State cooperation by those Court organs with the mandate to so engage – the 
Office of the Prosecutor, the Registry and the Presidency. There is some 
indication that these areas are being increasingly prioritised however to date this 
has only produced minimal and piecemeal results. There is also a cyclical problem 
of cross-blaming, with a tendency for certain States to disparage the Court for 
imprecise or inadequately worded cooperation requests which then impede them 
from cooperating effectively and for Court organs to place emphasis on States’ 
                                                          
18 Assembly of States Parties, Resolution on cooperation, 17 December 2014, para. 23. 
19 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58, Annex II, ICC-01/04-
520-Anx2, 10 February 2006, para. 151. 
failures to progress national or transnational investigations, which arguably States 
are better placed to undertake. For instance, in 2011, the Court reminded that ‘In 
some instances, the Court is not in possession of such required specific 
information regarding assets allegedly held by suspects on their territory and urges 
States Parties to complete to the extent possible the information contained in these 
requests which they may be able to access through national investigations.’20 In 
2012, a workshop was organised by the Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties’ 
facilitator on cooperation, in cooperation with the Court, on the subject of 
cooperation between the Court and States with a special focus on requests for 
assistance in identification, freezing and seizing of assets and property. This 
workshop produced a number of practical recommendations to the Court as well 
as States to improve the prospects for the enforcement of cooperation requests.21 
  
iv) Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute provides that ‘Where a State Party fails to 
comply with a request to cooperate by the Court contrary to the provisions of this 
Statute, thereby preventing the Court from exercising its functions and powers 
under this Statute, the Court may make a finding to that effect and refer the matter 
to the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council referred the 
matter to the Court, to the Security Council.’ In the Kenyatta case, the Court has 
determined that ‘non-compliance arising from, inter alia, unjustified inaction or 
delay, or a clear failure to have in place appropriate procedures for effecting the 
cooperation, as required under Article 88 of the Statute, constitutes failure to 
comply under Article 87(7) of the Statute which may, depending upon the 
circumstances, warrant a finding of non-compliance and concomitant referral 
under the same article. The approach of the relevant State during the cooperation 
process, as well as of the party seeking a finding under Article 87(7) of the 
Statute, may be of particular importance in finding whether there has been the 
standard of good faith cooperation required from State Parties.’22 However, 
because of the vaguely worded State obligations in respect to the recovery of 
property and assets, it has been difficult to identify clear instances in which a State 
Party has objectively failed to cooperate, and thus neither ICC chambers have 
                                                          
20 Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Court on cooperation, ICC-ASP/10/40, 18 November 2011, para. 34.  
21 ICC, Summary of the 1 October 2012 workshop on cooperation, including proposals and suggestions from the participants, in Assembly 
of States Parties, Report of the Bureau on cooperation, ICC-ASP/11/28, 23 October 2012, Annex 2.  
22 The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on Prosecution's application for a finding of non-compliance under Article 87(7) of 
the Statute, ICC-01/09-02/11-982, 3 December 2014, para 42. 
identified nor has the Assembly of States Parties deployed any political tools to 
respond to instances of non-cooperation in respect of requests pertaining to assets 
(unlike the actions, albeit limited, that have been taken to address the problem of 
States’ failure to cooperate with the Court on the enforcement of arrest warrants 
and surrenders to the Court of accused persons).23   
 
v) Far too limited engagement by most victims’ legal representatives to pursue 
assets. Under the statutory framework it is the Office of the Prosecutor that is 
tasked with the investigation of the property and assets of accused persons. 
Nonetheless, legal representatives for victims could do more to press the 
Prosecutor to act or to encourage the relevant chamber to issue cooperation 
requests on its motion.  
 
The paper considers some of these failings and also sets out the possible ways in which to 
strengthen the asset recovery regime, taking into account the many constraints.  
II. Rome Statute framework  
 
The Rome Statute and the associated rules of procedure and evidence outline a framework for 
the recovery of assets and property for the purposes of reparations to victims. States Parties 
are obligated to cooperate in the ‘identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, 
property and assets and instrumentalities of crimes for the purpose of eventual forfeiture’.24 
As will be described, this framework lacks clarity in many areas, which can impact on the 
effectiveness of requests to States and the capacity for their enforcement. 
II.1 Precautionary measures 
 
The ability for courts themselves, or States collaborating with them, to locate, freeze and 
seize assets of accused persons on a precautionary or provisional basis is a vital opportunity 
to safeguard assets for eventual reparations proceedings. Sometimes, such procedures are 
designed to help secure custody over suspects who remain at large on the basis that curtailing 
them from accessing their own funds will force them into the open or encourage them to 
                                                          
23 See e.g., Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau on non-cooperation, ICC-ASP/13/40, 5 December 2014, which deals 
exclusively with cases of non-surrender. 
24 Article 93(l)(k) of the ICC Statute. 
surrender. The property and assets that are frozen might eventually be used to contribute to 
the costs of defence, property may be returned to the rightful owners and in some instances 
the assets may be used to fund reparations to victims.  
 
Article 57(3)(e) of the Statute enables the Court to issue a request to States to take protective 
measures including freezing an accused person’s assets for the purpose of forfeiture, in 
particular for the ultimate benefit of victims. The provision makes specific reference to 
Article 93(1)(k) of the Statute, indicating that protective measures under Article 57(3)(e) are 
made ‘pursuant to’ Article 93(1)(k). Rule 99(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
specifies that: ‘the Pre-Trial Chamber, pursuant to Article 57, paragraph 3(e), or the Trial 
Chamber, pursuant to Article 75, paragraph 4, may, on its own motion or on the application 
of the Prosecutor or at the request of the victims or their legal representatives who have made 
a request for reparations or who have given a written undertaking to do so, determine whether 
measures should be adopted.’  
 
These provisions are of critical importance to the realisation of reparations awards, in those 
instances where there are assets and they are traceable. However, the wording of Article 
93(1)(k) refers to ‘the identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, property and 
assets and instrumentalities of crimes for the purpose of eventual forfeiture, without prejudice 
to the rights of bona fide third parties’. This would at first sight suggest that different from 
the clearer framework for post-conviction enforcement,25 the precautionary measures are 
aimed at proceeds of crime, not simply assets for eventual victims. To interpret Article 
93(1)(k) as requiring a link to proceeds of crime is to place a heavy evidential burden which 
must be met before any assets will be frozen. In order for assets to be considered proceeds of 
crime, there normally would need to be evidence that the assets are ‘ill-gotten gains’ that 
were procured through the criminal activity of the accused person. This is a usual evidential 
burden for forfeiture proceedings, given that if convicted, perpetrators would not able to keep 
the ill-gotten gains; the assets would be confiscated. But arguably it is an overly onerous 
burden for the freezing of assets for the ultimate benefit of victims, given that an order for 
reparations is akin to a civil debt against a convicted perpetrator – there is no need for the 
convicted perpetrator to satisfy that judgment through ill-gotten gains; the judgment can be 
satisfied by any assets belonging to the perpetrator.     
                                                          
25 Article 75(4) of the ICC Statute. See also, D. Donat-Cattin, Article 75, in O. Triffterer (Ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court. Observers’ notes, Article by Article 966 (1999), 966. 
 Despite the wording of Article 93(1)(k), so far chambers have taken an expansive view of the 
meaning of the provision. Chambers have included in, referred to, or annexed to arrest 
warrants, requests to States that they trace, freeze or seize the assets of persons named in 
those warrants,26 without requiring a link to the proceeds or instrumentalities of crimes. In 
addition, Chambers have issued separate requests to States to trace or freeze assets27 also 
without requiring such a restrictive nexus. However the issue is not free from debate. The 
interpretation of Article 57(3)(e) arose in a number of cases, including in the Lubanga28 and 
Kenyatta29 cases.  
 
In the Lubanga case, when determining whether it could seek the cooperation of States 
Parties to take protective measures for the purpose of securing the enforcement of a future 
reparation award pursuant to Article 57(3)(e), the Pre-Trial Chamber noted that ‘although a 
first reading of article 57 (3) (e) of the Statute might lead to the conclusion that cooperation 
requests for the taking of protective measures under such a provision can be aimed only at 
guaranteeing the enforcement of a future penalty of forfeiture under article 77 (2) of the 
Statute, the literal interpretation of the scope of such provision is not clear, because of the 
reference to the "ultimate benefit of the victims".’30 Not only does the Pre-Trial Chamber 
affirm the importance of making swift requests in order to avoid the dissipation of property or 
assets, nowhere in the decision does the Pre-Trial Chamber limit the subject matter to the 
proceeds or instrumentalities of crime. 
 
In the Kenyatta case, in 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber I had ordered  the Registrar to prepare and 
transmit a request for cooperation to the competent authorities of the Republic of Kenya for 
purposes of identifying, tracing and freezing or seizing the property and assets belonging to 
or under the control of Mr. Kenyatta. At a much later stage before the Trial Chamber, the 
                                                          
26 E.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58, Annex II, ICC-
01/04-520-Anx2, 10 February 2006; Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Order on the execution of the warrant of arrest against Germain 
Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-54-tENG, 5 November 2007.  
27 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Request to States Parties to the Rome Statute for the Identification, Tracing and Freezing 
or Seizure of the Property and Assets of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-62-tEN, 31 March 2006; Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga, Request to the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the Purpose of Obtaining the Identification, Tracing, Freezing and Seizure of 
the Property and Assets of Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-7-tENG 07-11-2007, 6 July 2007; Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, 
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Decision Ordering the Registrar to Prepare and Transmit a Request for 
Cooperation to the Republic of Kenya for the Purpose of Securing the Identification, Tracing and Freezing or Seizure of Property and 
Assets of Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11-42, 5 April 2011.  
28 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58, Annex II, ICC-01/04-
520-Anx2, 10 February 2006. 
29 Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on the implementation of the request to freeze assets, Trial Chamber V(B), ICC-01/09-
02/11, 8 July 2014. 
30 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58, 10 February 2006, 
para. 146. 
Registry brought to the attention of the Chamber the Kenyan Government’s refusal to execute 
the Pre-Trial Chamber's request on the basis that Article 93(1)(k) of the Statute only applies 
at the post-conviction phase and then only to assets that could be considered to be the 
proceeds or instrumentalities of the crime. The Trial Chamber held that the statutory 
framework does not require a nexus to be established with the proceeds or instrumentalities 
of the crime when ordering protective measures under Article 57(3)(e). It held that the term 
'forfeiture' may carry a broader meaning which encompasses an award for reparations. 
Referring to a teleological interpretation of Article 57(3)(e) of the Statute, and to ensure that 
the relevant Trial Chamber will have recourse to such assets for the purpose of an eventual 
order for reparations, the Trial Chamber held that it is necessary that protective measures are 
implemented at the earliest opportunity prior to the commencement of trial, after the issuance 
of a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear. Judge Henderson, in his dissent, took the view 
that Article 57(3)(e)of the Statute and Rule 99(1) of the Rules do not authorise a Chamber to 
request a State to take protective measures under Article 93 (1) of the Statute for the purposes 
of an order for reparations. In his view, protective measures can be taken for the purposes of 
eventual forfeiture, which in appropriate circumstances can be transferred to the Trust Fund 
and thereafter used for the benefit of the victims in an award for reparations. Under Judge 
Henderson’s analysis therefore, the forfeiture requirements (of the assets being linked to the 
proceeds and instrumentalities of crime) would appear to apply to protective measures.  
 
It is unclear how other Trial Chambers will interpret Article 57(3)(e) or whether the issue will 
in future be decided resolutely by the Appeals Chamber. The decision of the majority in the 
Kenyatta case, if it holds, is a progressive interpretation of the statutory framework which 
should encourage legal representatives for victims to actively engage with the Prosecution 
and the relevant Chambers on the issue of asset orders, for the ultimate benefit of victims.31  
 
However, regardless of the interpretation of Article 93(1)(k) by different ICC Chambers to 
date, the vagueness of the statutory framework has meant that the procedures put in place by 
certain States Parties to cooperate with such requests have narrowly focused on the proceeds 
and instrumentalities of crime.32 This has been the argument of Kenya in the Kenyatta case, 
though as indicated, the Trial Chamber majority rejected these arguments. In so doing, it 
                                                          
31 See, the similar approach taken in Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Order on the execution of the warrant of arrest against Germain 
Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-54-tENG, 5 November 2007 
32 See, e.g., Valerie Oosterveld, Mike Perry and John McManus, ‘The Cooperation of States with the International Criminal Court’ (2001-2) 
25 Fordham Int'l L.J. 767 which analyses certain domestic implementing legislation.  
reminded that States Parties are ‘under an obligation to "promptly", pursuant to Article 93(3) 
of the Statute, or "without delay", pursuant to Article 97 of the Statute, engage in 
consultations with a view to resolving the matter'. … ‘In the case of a genuine dispute 
regarding the legality of a request for cooperation, a State is directed by Regulation 108(1) of 
the Regulations of the Court ('Regulations') to apply for a ruling from the competent 
Chamber.’33  
II.2 Post-Conviction cooperation 
 
States Parties are obliged to give effect to fines and forfeitures ordered by the Court 
following a conviction, as well as reparations orders. Rule 217 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence provides that: ‘the Presidency shall, as appropriate, seek cooperation and measures 
for enforcement […] as well as transmit copies of relevant orders to any State with which the 
sentenced person appears to have direct connection by reason of either nationality, domicile 
or habitual residence or by virtue of the location of the sentenced person’s assets and property 
or with which the victim has such connection.’ Rule 218(3) provides further that ‘in order to 
enable States to give effect to an order for reparations, the order shall specify: (a) The identity 
of the person against whom the order has been issued; (b) In respect of reparations of a 
financial nature, the identity of the victims to whom individual reparations have been granted, 
and, where the award for reparations shall be deposited with the Trust Fund, the particulars of 
the Trust Fund for the deposit of the award; and (c) The scope and nature of the reparations 
ordered by the Court, including, where applicable, the property and assets for which 
restitution has been ordered.’ States would not have the ability to modify the reparations 
orders specified by the Court.34 The correct procedure is instead for persons affected by 
reparations orders to appeal the Court’s reparations decision.  
 
In accordance with these provisions, it is envisioned, at least as a matter of principle, that a 
Trial Chamber may order reparations without having previously identified the assets. The 
express reference by the Appeals Chamber in the Lubanga case to regulation 117 of the 
Regulations of the Court, which gives the Presidency the role of monitoring the financial 
situation of the sentenced person on an ongoing basis, even following completion of a 
sentence,35 underscores this interpretation. Clearly however, it is most advantageous for 
                                                          
33 Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on the implementation of the request to freeze assets, paras. 25, 26. 
34 Rule 219. 
35 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, Appeals Chamber judgment, 3 March 2015, para. 104. 
assets to be identified much earlier in the process so that there is less chance of dissipation 
and they can be frozen and made available to enforce reparations orders following a 
conviction.  
 
The Appeals Chamber did not address the issue as to what will happen to assets which come 
into the Court’s possession after the closure of reparations phase of a case. The Statute does 
not provide a clear avenue for victims’ legal representatives to seek to re-open reparations 
proceedings after the close of a case. Presumably, the Chamber assigned with overseeing the 
implementation of reparations orders would be capable of being seized if the assets are 
located during the enforcement process. If property or assets are located after the 
implementation of the reparations order is completed, the Presidency would arguably have 
the authority to constitute a new chamber for the purpose of determining what should 
transpire with those assets.  
III. Particular problem areas in the context of application 
III.1 Implementing legislation 
 
As the Court has itself set out, ‘The first obligation of States with respect to cooperation is to 
implement the Rome Statute in their domestic legislation and thereby provide, in particular, 
pursuant to article 88 procedures for “all of the forms of cooperation” specified in Part 9. 
Fulfilling this obligation constitutes a first step in order to ensure full cooperation with the 
Court. Without such implementing legislation, cooperation requests may encounter domestic 
legal hurdles in practice, since the legal and judicial authorities in charge of undertaking the 
requested measures may lack jurisdiction and power to proceed. Such implementing 
legislation is also likely to be necessary to set appropriate detailed procedural mechanisms.’36 
 
Yet, the vague provisions of the ICC Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence regarding 
assets and property recovery impede the practical results of such endeavours. This is 
compounded by the fact that the obligations of States Parties to cooperate with the Court and 
aid in the process of uncovering and transferring assets and property are to be implemented in 
accordance with the ‘procedure of national law.’37 States Parties must ensure that the 
                                                          
36 ICC, Report of the Court on International Cooperation and Assistance, in Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau on 
cooperation, ICC-ASP/8/44, 15 November 2009, Annex 1, para. 15.  
37 Article 93(1) of the Statute.  
necessary procedures are in place at the national level in order to be able to execute a request 
from the Court to this end. While the Statute makes clear that the absence of adequate 
domestic laws and procedures does not justify non-compliance,38 in reality however, few 
States have sufficiently robust procedures to respond to asset and property requests 
emanating from the Court. States’ implementing legislation and the associated procedures put 
in place by States to foster cooperation are often insufficiently robust, clear or sufficient to do 
the job. Inevitably, gaps result in delays and inefficiencies when faced with a cooperation 
request which allows for funds and property to be transferred out of a jurisdiction or 
dissipated with relative ease. 
 
In the case of non-States Parties, there is no overriding obligation to cooperate with the Court 
though those non-States Parties who wish to cooperate with the Court may do so, ‘on the 
basis of an ad hoc arrangement, an agreement with such States or any other appropriate 
basis.’39   
If assets are located on the territory or in the control of non-States Parties, the Court, or the 
individual recipients of reparations orders, would need to advocate for the recognition of the 
ICC order in that jurisdiction. If a non-State Party has entered into an ad hoc arrangement or 
an agreement with the Court, and thereafter fails to cooperate with requests pursuant to any 
such arrangement or agreement, the Court may so inform the Assembly of States Parties or, 
where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, the Security Council.40 The 
Statute does not specify whether arrangements or agreements the Court enters into can be 
revoked or altered by non-States Parties or the terms by which any such alterations may be 
made. The ability for the Court to ensure the enforcement of such agreements in the absence 
of the good faith will of the State to comply seems minimal at best. 
III.2 The disposition of assets subject to sanctions regimes and other parallel freezing 
orders 
 
In certain cases, assets belonging to perpetrators may have been frozen pursuant to Security 
Council or other sanctions regimes, and the ability of the ICC to obtain control of those assets 
for the purposes of reparations is untested. A number of situation countries have been the 
subject of UN Security Council sanctions regimes, with several defendants featuring directly 
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on lists of persons whose property or assets should be frozen. The relationship between those 
sanctions regimes and the ICC’s cooperation regime are untested. As a matter of principle, 
obligations pursuant to Article 103 of the UN Charter would trump any obligations States 
Parties have to cooperate with the Court.41 Thus, States Parties faced with competing requests 
from the ICC and from the Security Council may be compelled to act first and foremost on 
the Security Council requests.  
 
This challenge of dealing with such competing obligations has been noted by the Bureau of 
the Assembly of States Parties’ facilitator on cooperation, and States Parties have been 
encouraged to ‘handle such requests on the basis of article 93, paragraph 9(b), of the Rome 
Statute, respectful of Article 103 of the United Nations Charter’42 and ‘continue to provide 
political and diplomatic support to the Court, and, where possible, consider approaching the 
United Nations Security Council (hereinafter UNSC) and/or the sanctions committees, with a 
view to finding arrangements that would allow the UNSC and sanctions committees to share 
more information with the Court with regard to assets.’43 Further, States Parties have been 
requested to ‘be mindful of how the wording of UNSC resolutions may affect the Court’s 
execution of its mandate, and, where possible, try to influence the wording of such 
resolutions to take into account the operational needs of the Court. The possibility of adding 
provisions to resolutions allowing for (partial) unfreezing of frozen assets to allow for 
payment of Court-related legal fees could be explored.’44  
 
However the ability of the Security Council to order the transfer of assets to the Court is 
untested. The Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the 
United Nations45 provides no guidance. It has been recommended that ‘when cognisant that 
the same assets could be requested to be frozen or identified by the Court, [States should] 
take necessary measures on the national level so that information gathered in connection with 
the implementation of the UNSC resolution could be shared with the national focal point or 
the relevant national authority for Court cooperation.’46 Yet arguably, the Court should be 
engaging the Security Council directly, and negotiating further provisions to outline the 
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modalities for sharing of information regarding competing requests, and where possible, 
ensuring that funds frozen pursuant to Security Council resolutions can as appropriate 
contribute to the fulfilment of the Court’s reparations orders. Importantly, in 2012, the 
Prosecutor noted that ‘Since the opening of the situation, the Office has been in contact with 
the UN Sanctions Committee, which is assisted by a Panel of Experts and with Interpol to 
coordinate its investigative efforts in relation to the assets of the suspects. The Court has sent 
at the end of September requests for assistance to Libya, State Parties, and five UN Security 
Council non-State Parties to identify, trace, seize and freeze all the personal assets belonging 
to the suspects. The Office strongly encourages the Security Council and States to assist the 
Court in identifying and isolating these assets.’47 These are crucial steps. 
 
There are several instances in which property or other assets frozen pursuant to Security 
Council procedures have subsequently been unfrozen, however the ICC’s outstanding 
requests are not known to have featured in the analysis of whether or how these should be 
unfrozen and who should ultimately benefit. For instance, some of the Libyan frozen assets 
have progressively been unfrozen ‘for the benefit of the Libyan people,’48 even though the 
ICC still has an open case against Abdallah Al-Senussi.    
 
III.3 Competing claims for assets 
 
In the event that property or assets are located and frozen, a question arises as to the 
circumstances and modalities in which they will be made accessible for the purposes of 
reparations. The ICC will have a number of uses for the assets which go beyond reparations, 
such as for instance, the payment of defendants’ legal costs that had, prior to the location of 
the assets, been covered by legal aid. Rule 21(5) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
provides that: ‘where a person claims to have insufficient means to pay for legal assistance 
and this is subsequently found not to be so, the Chamber dealing with the case at that time 
may make an order of contribution to recover the cost of providing counsel.’ However, in 
accordance with Rule 221(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Presidency, which 
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is mandated to decide on the disposition or allocation of such assets, ‘shall give priority to the 
enforcement of measures concerning reparations to victims’.  
 
While in principle Rule 221 clarifies that reparations will trump other claims emanating from 
the Court, and the importance of this prioritisation has been underscored by the Assembly of 
States Parties,49 it is nonetheless possible that the timing of the operation of the different 
procedures may inhibit the operation of the rule. Rule 221 arguably operates after conviction, 
whereas rule 21(5) may operate at an earlier stage. Thus, it is possible that there will be a 
dissipation of assets through the operation of Rule 21(5) prior to the end of the trial, which 
will work against the ultimate benefit of victims. For instance, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
partially allowed some of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo’s assets that had been frozen by 
Portugal to be unfrozen, in order to allow for him to pay for his defence and to provide the 
minimum upkeep to his family.50  
 
Further it is not evident how national courts will deal with the competing claims for assets, or 
how they will assign priorities in order to adjudicate between these claims. For instance, 
reparations orders against former heads of State or senior officials may give rise to competing 
claims against the perpetrator for corruption or misappropriation of State funds. There may 
also be additional creditors and/or victims who did not apply through the ICC reparations 
process, whose claims would need to be adjudicated by national courts. The Rome Statute 
deals with competing surrender or extradition requests,51 but not competing requests for other 
forms of cooperation such as assets. When there are competing surrender or extradition 
requests, there is an obligation on the State with the competing requests to notify the Court 
and the requesting State of that fact, and if the requesting State is a State Party and the case is 
determined to be admissible before the Court, the Statute determines that the Court has 
priority.52 In contrast, the Rome Statute provides no real answer in relation to competing asset 
requests. There is simply the obligation on States Parties pursuant to Articles 93(3) and 97 of 
the Statute, to engage in consultations with a view to resolving the matter, and/or to apply for 
a ruling from the competent Chamber.  
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Article 93(1)(k) underscores that measures can be taken ‘without prejudice to the rights of 
bona fide third parties.’ Yet, if there are indeed bona fide third parties, it is unclear how these 
would be dealt with. It is unclear whether the Court would take upon itself the task of 
determining whether the claims of third parties are bona fide. Rule 99(3) indicates that’ If an 
order is made without prior notification, the relevant Chamber shall request the Registrar, as 
soon as is consistent with the effectiveness of the measures requested, to notify those against 
whom a request is made and, to the extent possible, to any interested persons or any 
interested States and invite them to make observations as to whether the order should be 
revoked or otherwise modified.’ But it is unclear how this provision would operate in 
practice. Presumably the victims before the ICC will be just as bona fide as any other bona 
fide third party. On one reading, the beneficiaries of an ICC reparations awards may only 
benefit from assets if there are no other parties with a claim to those assets.    
 
There are frameworks in anti-corruption and money laundering treaties that may be useful to 
peruse for ideas but they do not apply as such. The closest example is perhaps the Swiss 
attempts to broker an equitable solution when Philippine recipients of an American Alien 
Tort Claims Act judgment in Hawaii sought to enforce their award against assets frozen in 
Switzerland, and at the same time the Philippines Government was seeking return of the 
Marcos’ ill-gotten gains – misappropriation of State funds. But this brokering of a solution 
was not perfect, nor can it be easily replicated in the context of the ICC. In the Swiss case, 
Switzerland was in possession of the disputed assets was faced with the decision as to how 
best to equitably allocate those assets. In the case of the ICC, invariably the Court will not be 
in possession of the assets.  
IV. Conclusion 
 
Clearly there remain a lot of unanswered questions and several important gaps in the 
applicable legal and procedural frameworks which combine to make the prospects of asset 
recovery both daunting and remote. Given victims’ limited procedural rights before the ICC, 
their lack of standing before the sanctions committees of the United Nations and the extreme 
difficulties if not impossibility they will encounter to access courts in the countries where 
property and other assets may be located, the Court must work with States Parties and non-
States Parties alike, and intergovernmental organisations in order to resolve the many 
remaining uncertainties. This must be done at the earliest possible opportunity if the 
reparations regime of the ICC is to live up to its promise.  
